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On the Orthodox Nature of Heterodox Income 
Distribution Theory
By Ross Nichols
Abstract
The goal of this paper is to show that orthodox and heterodox theories of personal 
income distribution developed in the mid-twentieth century are effectively 
identical, despite their claims to the contrary.  While segmented labor market 
theory contends that neoclassical theories of personal income distribution, such as 
human capital theory, ignore the impact of social institutions on the labor market, 
human capital theory actually implicitly incorporates them.  Social institutions 
are, therefore, just as important in the orthodox approach to personal income 
distribution.  Yet, while this is the case, the heterodox perspective is valuable 
because of the stress it places on social institutions, the importance of which is not 
always explicitly recognized in human capital theory.  
Introduction:
 A.B. Atkinson titled his 1996 Presidential Address to the Royal 
Economic Society, “Bringing Income Distribution in from the Cold.”  His 
rationale for doing so was that income distribution in the twentieth century was 
studied mainly through the lens of development economics, and that it therefore 
neglected the theory behind income distribution itself (Atkinson, 1997, 299). 
He believed that economists placed too much emphasis on studying the effects 
of income distribution at the cost of failing to attempt to understand the causes 
of income distribution.  The study of income distribution had diverged from 
explaining “how the economy works” (ibid., 299).  Atkinson urged the need for 
economics to collaborate with other social sciences to incorporate the importance 
of social norms into income distribution analysis because “a subject so central 
to social science as income distribution is one that we [economists] cannot solve 
on our own, and…a receptiveness to outside ideas [is] a sign of a discipline in 
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good health” (ibid., 318).  Building an adequate income distribution theory thus 
required an interdisciplinary approach.  But what Atkinson, as a representative of 
contemporary mainstream economics, failed to recognize was that great strides 
had been made in income distribution theory during the twentieth century.  A 
renaissance had occurred several decades earlier that was of paramount importance 
to the theory of income distribution.  Theories of personal income distribution 
emerged during the mid-twentieth century.  
 A study of the rebirth of income distribution theory naturally raises 
questions concerning the timing of this renaissance.  One of the main goals of 
classical political economy was to explain how income was distributed between 
classes.  During that time, a tension developed between the classical theory of 
income distribution and its Marxian critique that stemmed from the implications 
Ricardo and Marx drew from their respective class theories of income distribution. 
Renewed vigor of theoretical work on income distribution occurred in the mid-
twentieth century and led to a seemingly much more decisive split between 
neoclassical economists and their critics.  Whereas the theoretical foundations of 
Ricardian and Marxian theories of income distribution were similar, heterodox 
economists argued that the logic underpinning neoclassical theories of income 
distribution was flawed. 
 Sahota (1977) found human capital theory to be one of the most 
complete theories of personal income distribution developed by the neoclassicals. 
Human capital theory drew closely upon the theory of marginal productivity 
to explain how income was distributed between individuals rather than social 
classes.  Instead of analyzing income distribution within the context of capitalists 
and laborers, the focus of income distribution theory shifted to an analysis of 
how income was distributed between labor and capital as factors of production. 
Segmented labor market theory was introduced as a neo-Marxian critique of 
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human capital theory. 6  It was based on the argument that sociopolitical forces 
sorted workers into distinct and rigid labor markets.  Individual incomes were 
thus largely the product of class relations in the workplace.  Segmented labor 
market theory argued that “the law of one price will not prevail in labor markets, 
even in the long run” (Rebitzer, 1993, 1411).  The rebirth of interest in income 
distribution thus appeared to generate a wide split between competing theories of 
personal income distribution.  Segmented labor market theory criticized human 
capital theory for neglecting the role of social institutions in the distribution of 
personal income. 
 Closer analysis of human capital theory and segmented labor market 
theory, however, reveals that these two theories are essentially equivalent.  Rebitzer 
(1993) cites several instances of neoclassical economists incorporating the notion 
of segmented labor markets into their work, but the relationship between human 
capital theory and segmented labor market theory is much closer than previous 
literature implies.  Therefore not only is it important to study the rebirth of 
income distribution in the mid-twentieth as a reminder to contemporary economic 
discourse of the theoretical work done on income distribution during this time, the 
mid-twentieth century also produced a heated debate between neoclassicals and 
neo-Marxists concerning the explanation of the distribution of personal income. 
And while Rebitzer acknowledges that these opposing views were reconciled to 
an extent, this paper will show that human capital theory and segmented labor 
market theory are even more fundamentally similar than Rebitzer suggests.  In 
short, a better understanding of how income distribution theory was “brought in 
from the cold,” and the implications associated with this revival, is needed. 
6 Both neo-Marxists and neo-institutionalists advocate forms of segmented labor market theory.  
While Osterman, Rebitzer and Piore are referenced in the text, they are considered neo-insti-
tutionalists. Since the purpose of this paper is to compare segmented labor market theory with 
human capital theory rather than examine the various forms of segmented labor market theory, 
the two groups are not differentiated.
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 The following analysis is divided into six sections.  The first section 
examines the origins of income distribution theory in classical and Marxian 
economics, and show that classical political economy never attempted to develop 
a theory of personal income distribution.  In the second section, I discuss how 
Clark’s theory of marginal productivity served as a bridge to the development 
of theories of personal income distribution in the mid-twentieth century.  In the 
third section, I analyze the circumstances that contributed to the rise of theories 
of personal income distribution and present the theoretical foundations of human 
capital theory.  I also examine the criticisms of human capital theory.  The fourth 
section focuses on the critique of human capital theory developed by radical 
political economy in an effort to show how segmented labor market theory 
emerged as an important heterodox explanation of personal income distribution. 
The fifth section shows that orthodox and heterodox explanations of personal 
income distribution share close theoretical foundations and are thus effectively 
identical explanations for the distribution of personal income.  The only discernible 
difference between the two is the emphasis placed on social institutions.  In the 
final section, I briefly summarize my findings.      
    
I. Classical and Marxian Theories of Income Distribution
 Writing at the height of classical political economy, Ricardo believed 
that income distribution was so important to political economy that economics 
should be defined as “an enquiry into the laws which determine the division of the 
produce of industry amongst the classes who concur in its formation” (Ricardo, 
1951, 278).  In short, Ricardo contended that the distribution of income was the 
machine that drove the economy.  Explaining the rate of profit was one of the main 
goals of Ricardo’s Principles.
 Ricardo argued that “the produce of the earth – all that is derived 
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from its surface by the united application of labour, machinery, and capital, is 
divided among three classes of the community” (Ricardo, 1821, v).  The profits 
that accrued to capitalists were the product of capitalist relationships with both 
landlords and laborers.  Ricardo accepted the Malthusian theory of population 
and its attendant assumption that rapid population growth would drive wages 
down to the subsistence level.  Profits were thus governed by a socially and 
morally7 determined level of subsistence.  Yet while profits were determined by 
the subsistence wage level, the subsistence wage and technology level was in 
turn determined by “the quantity of labour requisite to provide necessaries for 
the labourers, on that land or with that capital that yields no rent” (ibid., 128).  In 
effect, the profits of capitalists were determined by the extent to which infertile 
land was being used to grow the crops on which workers subsisted.  
There was thus a tendency for the rate of profit “to fall; for, in the progress 
of society and wealth, the additional quantity of food required is obtained by the 
sacrifice of more and more labour” (ibid, 120).  As society progressed, increasingly 
less fertile land came under cultivation which subsequently increased the amount of 
rent collected by landlords.  This made food more expensive, forcing capitalists to 
pay higher wages and keep a smaller portion of their revenue.  Furthermore, a high 
rate of profit attracted outside capital so competition depressed profit rates, but “a 
fall in the general rate of profits is by no means incompatible with a partial rise of 
profits” (ibid., 119).  Capitalists could therefore experience positive profits despite 
declining rates of profit due to counteracting influences such as increased demand.
Karl Marx agreed with the general framework of class income distribution 
theory laid out by Ricardo.  He too believed that there was a tendency for the rate 
of profits to fall and wages to fluctuate around the subsistence level.  Non-wage 
7 Ricardo argues that the natural wage in a country “essentially depends on the habits and 
customs of the people” in a given country (Ricardo, 91).  That is, the level of sustenance that is 
acceptable in one country is not necessarily the same in all countries.  If a worker lives in a so-
ciety with high wants, their wage will be higher than if they lived in a society of simpler means.
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income was accepted as a residual measurement.  Marx, however, thought two 
important aspects of class income distribution needed to be addressed.  First, he 
differentiated between labor and labor power.  Labor power “is to be understood 
[as] the aggregate of those mental and physical capabilities existing in a human 
being, which he exercises whenever he produces a use-value of any description” 
(Marx, 1867, 167).  Marx believed that labor power was a commodity sold by 
laborers.  Whereas labor power was the potential to do work, “labour-power in 
use is labour itself” (ibid., 177).  Labor was thus the act of realizing the ability to 
work.  This distinction was important because it is the foundation for his concept 
of surplus value.  Humans had a capacity to work much greater than the amount of 
labor we need to expend to replenish this potential.  Marx referred to the portion 
of the working day needed to earn enough for subsistence “‘necessary’ labor 
time” (ibid., 217).  Any labor expended beyond this point generated surplus value 
for capitalists.
Capitalists therefore paid laborers just enough to ensure their subsistence 
but extracted an excessively large amount of labor compared to the amount of 
labor necessary for subsistence.  Marx also argued that wages tended towards 
subsistence, but his rationale for why this occurred was different from Ricardo’s. 
Marx rejected the Malthusian theory of population as an explanation for the 
tendency of wages to fluctuate around the subsistence level.  He instead believed 
that an “industrial reserve army” of unemployed workers was maintained by 
capitalists in order to foster competition between laborers and prevent wage 
increases (ibid., 632).  Furthermore, the presence of an industrial reserve army 
resulted from the historical evolution of capitalism.  As capitalism progressed, 
capitalists accumulated increasingly more capital.  The majority of this 
accumulation was ever more productive physical capital.  Demand for variable 
capital (i.e. labor) therefore grew at “constantly diminishing rate” because it 
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became a smaller and smaller portion of total capital (ibid., 629). According 
to Marx, downward pressure on wages was thus not a natural occurrence but 
rather a phenomenon specific to the historical conditions of the capitalist mode 
of production.      
 Classical and Marxian income distribution theories shared similar 
foundations.  While Marx sought to improve upon Ricardian theory, the biggest 
difference between the two was the nature of capitalism.  Ricardo argued 
that since capitalists would only produce commodities for which there was 
sufficient demand, capitalists would naturally seek to accumulate capital up to 
the point where profits equaled zero (Ricardo, 340).  A decreasing rate of profit 
was attributable to higher wages made necessary by the diminishing marginal 
productivity of agriculture.  Accumulation was thus portrayed as a self-regulating 
phenomenon that ensured stability in capitalism.  Ricardo acknowledged the 
existence of intense competition between capitalists to accumulate capital, but did 
not believe that capital necessarily became concentrated within an ever smaller 
group of capitalists.        
 Marx rejected the notion that accumulation was governed by the rate of 
profit.  He contended that accumulation was necessary for capitalist survival in 
the capitalist mode of production: 
“the development of capitalist production makes it constantly 
necessary to keep increasing the amount of capital…and competition 
makes the immanent laws of capitalist production to be felt by each 
individual capitalist, as external coercive laws.  It compels him to keep 
constantly extending his capital, in order to preserve it” (ibid., 592).
Accumulation fostered vicious competition between capitalists, the losers in which 
did not survive.  Marx believed that as capital became concentrated in a shrinking 
group of capitalists, capitalists would exert a greater degree of exploitation of the 
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working class.  Ultimately, this desire for accumulation would contribute to the 
downfall of capitalism after a critical mass of degraded proletariats was reached, 
sparking a popular revolt against the capitalists (ibid., 763).  While Ricardo 
asserted that the desire for accumulation could wane peacefully, Marx depicted a 
much more urgent picture of capital accumulation.
Obstacles to an Analysis of Personal Income Distribution
 There are two important reasons why Ricardo and Marx never attempted 
to develop a theory of personal income distribution.  Class conflict caused a rise 
in class consciousness that hindered the ability of Ricardo and Marx to analyze 
income on a personal level.  It simply did not make sense for Ricardo and Marx 
to study how personal income distribution when people increasingly identified 
themselves as members of a class rather than as individuals.  This is exemplified 
in the controversy surrounding the Corn Laws, where capitalists and landlords 
competed to attain supremacy in the public arena. Whichever class prevailed was 
effectively able to dictate how income was distributed between classes.  Capitalists 
and landlords viewed themselves as part of a greater class movement rather 
than individual members of society.  In addition, the labor force of the time was 
relatively more homogenous than it is today.  This made it difficult to differentiate 
workers or treat them as individual economic agents.  Ricardo and Marx, at least 
from an economic perspective, would have had difficulty distinguishing between 
individual members of a given class.
Ricardo and Marx lived in an era when class conflict was at the center 
of policymaking in Europe.  Class distributions of income reflected economists’ 
perspectives on class conflict.  The controversy over the British Corn Laws 
demonstrated the tension between landlords and capitalists that persisted during 
the rise of classical political economy.  Landlords favored implementing the Corn 
Laws because protection from foreign competition allowed landlords to charge 
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higher rents.  Capitalists wanted to keep food prices as low as possible because the 
subsistence level depended upon the price at which workers could feed themselves 
in order to restore their labor power.  Cheaper food meant higher profits for 
capitalists.  While enacting the Corn Laws seemed to favor the landlords and their 
repeal appeared to cater to the interests of the urban capitalists, class conflict was 
much more complex than a dispute between capitalists and landlords.  Conflict 
also arose between members of the same social class as class distinctions blurred. 
 One instance of intra-class tension arose between established landlords 
and newly landed capitalists.  Many established landlords favored legislation that
 “served to reinforce the status of the existing elites of both town and 
countryside by re-emphasizing the notion that the prosperity of the 
various classes which composed the same interest group was primarily 
affected not by one another but by a rival interest group [the urban 
capitalists],” (Moore, 1965, 544). 
The Corn Laws thus strove to maintain the status quo of class relations in 
British society.  That hierarchy survived mainly on the mutual interest among 
well-established landed and capitalist elites to preserve traditional British social 
structure.  Yet as industry expanded in Great Britain, the formerly mutual interests 
between rural and urban elites diverged.  Capitalists sought cheap food to keep 
production costs down but established, or hereditary, landlords wanted prices to 
remain high.  Hereditary landlords sought to maintain prosperity through high 
agricultural prices, but an “arriviste” class of newly landed elites who had made 
a fortune in the cities strove to reap profits by implementing innovative farming 
techniques that increased crop production (ibid., 551).  Social standing of older 
landed elites was further undermined by capitalists who purchased land in order 
to accumulate more capital.  As the pace of capital accumulation accelerated 
and landed capitalists subsequently gained influence, older landlords felt their 
authority in the public arena begin to wane.
70
The eventual repeal of the Corn Laws ultimately benefited the capitalist 
class because foreign competition lowered food prices, but Sir Robert Peel’s 
official justification for presenting the necessary legislation was “to extricate the 
kingdom from the social dilemmas” that arose from the incessant class disputes 
in European society that dominated the era (ibid., 560).  Thus while the repeal 
of the Corn Laws had economic implications, it was more focused on achieving 
social harmony.  Peel wanted to encourage the hereditary landed elite to shift their 
focus from prices to output, and thus develop an entrepreneurial outlook similar 
to capitalists.  Unfortunately, this legislation was misguided in that it “failed to 
recognize the impossibility of commercializing the status of the landlord without 
also commercializing the status of the tenant” (ibid., 559).  Urban capitalists 
emerged as the victors from repeal of the Corn Laws because legislators failed to 
comprehend the nature of the rural hierarchy properly. The controversial nature of 
the Corn Laws and their repeal was representative of the divide within classes that 
existed during the rise of classical political economy and the critiques that quickly 
followed.  Since class conflict dominated European society, income distribution 
was viewed as a class-based issue rather than one pertaining to individuals.
 The relative homogeneity of the labor force also inhibited the ability 
to differentiate between individuals.  Reich, Gordon, and Edwards argued that 
before the era of monopoly capitalism began in 1890, production was governed 
by the rules of competitive capitalism (Reich, Gordon, and Edwards, 1973, 360). 
Production was heavily standardized, primarily took place in factories, and involved 
many simple tasks.  Capitalists favored this type of production strategy because 
strong competition disincentivized the extra expenses associated with the types of 
specialized training that accompanied monopoly capitalism.  Monopoly capitalism 
was characterized by the production of differentiated good by specialized labor. 
Furthermore, the dramatic rise in population and movement of unskilled workers 
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into concentrated urban areas ensured that a large supply of easily substitutable 
labor was readily available for capitalists to draw from (Brown, 1977, 72).
 Increasing class consciousness and a relatively homogenous labor 
force prevented Ricardo and Marx from examining the distribution of income 
on a personal level.  It did not make sense for them to study personal income 
distribution when public debates such as those surrounding the Corn Laws were 
class-based.  Individuals were viewed more as members of a social class rather 
than unique economic agents.  The structure of industry during this era made 
it even more difficult to study society on an individual level.  Production often 
centered on simple, repetitive tasks so labor was easily interchangeable.    
II. Marginal Productivity Theory
 Ricardo first introduced the marginal principle to economic theory.  He 
argued that as less fertile land came under cultivation, the rent on more fertile land 
increased (Ricardo, 1821, 60).  John Bates Clark endeavored to expand Ricardo’s 
marginal principle in two important ways.  In his Distribution of Wealth, Clark 
generalized the principle of substitution to include all factors of production, and 
proposed that “the pay of labor in each industry tends to conform to the marginal 
product of social labor employed in connection with a fixed amount of social 
capital, as such” (Clark, 1899, 116; emphasis his).  Although Clark articulated 
an explanation of how the natural rates of profits and wages were determined 
endogenously, he maintained the classical assumption that the endowments of 
capital and labor were naturally determined.  Consequently, while the theory of 
marginal productivity inspired later theories of personal income distribution, it is 
itself more a theory of factor demands than one of income distribution.  
Clark developed his theory of marginal productivity as an analogue to 
Ricardo’s explanation of rents.  He imagined a “universal field for employment” 
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that included all workers (ibid, 110).  Those who had access to the central field 
of fertile land or a sufficiently stocked store naturally had access to higher levels 
of productivity.  Workers located farther from this central field had to choose 
from lower quality employment.  In the zone of indifference, employers earned 
zero profit and thus stopped hiring.  Competition ensured that all employers hired 
employees up to this point.  The analogy of a universal field for employment is 
important because of an important aspect Clark omitted from his discussion: he 
did not explain how workers were placed throughout the field, or if it was possible 
for them to move from their initial position.  Their position was determined 
naturally.  During the rebirth of income distribution theory in the coming decades, 
this assumption motivated human capital theory and segmented labor market 
theory to explain how workers moved within the “universal field of employment.” 
 The theory of marginal productivity also maintained the classical 
assumption of homogenous labor.  Clark acknowledged that skilled workers were 
more productive than unskilled workers, but argued that all labor could be measured 
in the same units of labor (ibid., 63).  He therefore assumed that all labor could 
be reduced to a common denominator, which minimized the importance of skill 
differential.  A skilled worker could be replaced by two or more less-skilled workers. 
Although Clark maintained these important classical assumptions, he departed from 
the classical theory of income distribution in several important ways.  
Foremost among Clark’s critiques of classical political economy was the 
argument that Ricardian economics was an endeavor that “was really studying a 
static…world with no complete idea of its nature,” which he addressed by relaxing 
the assumption of a static economy (ibid., 69).  Clark believed that economic 
theory needed to reflect the dynamic nature of the world.  The Distribution of 
Wealth can thus be viewed as his attempt to complete Ricardo’s work.  While 
natural law remained a governing principal in that the productivity of workers was 
73
naturally determined, “social economic dynamics” such as increasing population 
and wealth, technological innovation, introduction of new products, and labor 
flow between groups were introduced (ibid., 73).  Clark realized that the state of 
the world in the present was not the same as it was in the past, and that it would 
also be different in the future.  Even though wages naturally tended to their natural 
level, the dynamic nature of society had to be taken into account.  The biggest 
contribution Clark made to income distribution theory was that the determination 
of wages adhered to natural law because they were equal to an exogenously 
determined marginal productivity, while granting that these exogenous forces 
changed over time.  To put it concisely, “what we have to see is how static laws 
operate in a dynamic state” (ibid., 403).    
 It is clear that Clark drew upon Ricardo when formulating his theory 
of marginal productivity, yet there is also evidence that he did more than simply 
apply the marginal principle to include all factors of production.  Ricardo held 
the proportion of capital to labor constant; his theory of rents, therefore, assumed 
varying fertility of the soil.  Clark varied the factors of production separately (ibid., 
163).  While Ricardo assumed technology to be unchanging, the interchangeability 
between labor and capital in The Distribution of Wealth implied that technological 
change was an important aspect of production.  This is an important implication 
because it allowed human capital theory to maintain that labor was both dynamic 
and highly substitutable, a necessary condition for the assumption of perfect 
competition in the labor market underpinning human capital theory.  
 The Distribution of Wealth inspired future work on personal income 
distribution theory through the introduction of the idea that workers were paid 
according to their marginal productivity.  Clark touted his work as “an inspiring 
vista for future advances” in economic theory (ibid., 75).  What he did not foresee, 
however, were future attempts to treat social economic dynamics as endogenous 
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to the explanation of personal income distribution.  Relaxing the assumption of 
natural skill determination served as the impetus for numerous theories of personal 
income distribution.  Whereas Clark took the distribution of factor endowments 
as given, future work on income distribution sought to explain how marginal 
productivity was determined.  Theories of personal income distribution can be 
seen as an extension of marginal productivity theory.  While marginal productivity 
closely identified with classical political economy, Clark’s work effectively broke 
the hegemony of class income distribution in economic analysis. 
III. Theories of Personal Income Distribution
Circumstances Contributing to the Rise of Theories of Personal Income 
Distribution
 One of the reasons economic thought focused upon theories of personal 
distribution during the renaissance of income distribution in the mid-twentieth 
century was the widespread study of the causes of discrimination.  Becker’s The 
Economics of Discrimination (1957) was one of the pioneering works on the 
subject.  Becker argued that it was possible to conduct an economic analysis of the 
effects of discrimination because “if an individual has a ‘taste for discrimination,’ 
he must act as if he were willing to pay something either directly or in form of 
reduced income, to be associated with some persons instead of others” (Becker, 
1971 (1957), 14).  Employers associated non-pecuniary costs of production with 
minority employees.  This “taste” resulted from prejudice and ignorance, and 
varied both temporally and spatially.  
 Although Becker believed that discrimination in the labor force existed, 
he also believed the forces creating discrimination were dynamic.  The level of 
discrimination present in the work place could thus change over time.  To test 
this, he measured the change in average occupational position for both whites 
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and minorities from 1910-1950.  Relative occupational position was measured by 
comparing the income for skilled, semiskilled, and unskilled minorities with the 
average incomes for their respective white counterparts.  Becker found that the 
relative occupational position of minority workers had remained stable over time 
(ibid., 140).  Discrimination had therefore not decreased.  An absolute increase 
in income for minorities did not necessarily imply an increase in their position 
relative to whites because the incomes of white employees increased as well.  
 The Economics of Discrimination served as an impetus for numerous 
studies examining the impact of discrimination.  Rayack (1961) and Gilman 
(1965) criticized Becker’s arguments about the persistence and magnitude of 
discrimination in the workplace, respectively.  Rayack argued that Becker’s 
conclusion of an unchanged level of discrimination towards blacks, as measured 
by their income relative to whites in the first half of the twentieth century resulted 
from the erroneous construction of his occupational index (Rayack, 1961, 210). 
Rayack believed Becker did not account for the fact that blacks were heavily 
concentrated in semi-skilled and unskilled professions.  After generating an 
occupational index that factored in this characteristic, Rayack showed that 
income for blacks had, in general, increased more than it had for whites so that by 
1957 the occupational position of blacks had increased by 34 percent relative to 
1900 (ibid., 211).  He also contended, however, that this increase did not reflect 
a decrease in discrimination.  The increase was instead due to increased demand 
for labor, and any sustained increase in occupational position was “substantially, 
a function of the tightness of the labor market” (ibid., 214).  Becker could thus 
be correct in his assessment that the level of discrimination in the labor force 
had remained unchanged throughout the twentieth century and simultaneously 
incorrect in his belief that the position of blacks in the workplace had improved 
neither absolutely nor relatively.
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 Gilman (1965) provided a further critique of The Economics of 
Discrimination.  He believed that the impact of discrimination on minority 
unemployment was significantly smaller than initially thought (Gilman, 1965, 
1080).  This evidence challenged the notion that minorities were targeted in the 
hiring-firing process.  Gilman drew a conclusion similar to Rayack (1961) by 
suggesting that discrimination was most evident in wage rigidity.  Minorities 
experienced greater wage rigidity and thus higher unemployment rates because 
“the greater the pressure in an occupation or region for nonwhite-white wage 
equality, the greater will be the gap between equilibrium and actual wages, and 
the greater will be the reduction in employment opportunities for nonwhite 
relative to white workers” (ibid., 1091).  Minimum wage laws and unions keep 
the actual wage above the equilibrium wage.  The greater this disparity, the fewer 
employment opportunities for minority workers there would be.
 Regardless of the extent to which discrimination existed, one reason it 
endured in the labor market was imperfect information.  Gathering information on 
potential employees was costly, which made it difficult for minorities and females 
to show that they were equally as skilled as their white male counterparts.  Arrow 
(1971) claimed that minorities and women were paid less than equally skilled white 
male employees because “skin color and sex are cheap sources of information” 
(Arrow, 1971, 25).  Employers had preconceived notions of the productivity of 
women and minorities, and imperfect information in the labor market allowed 
these prejudices to persist.  There was less incentive for female and minority 
workers to make the investments necessary to increase their productivity because 
no amount of investment could outweigh the cheap information provided by their 
skin color or gender (ibid., 29).  Therefore while a minority or female worker and 
a white worker could begin with the same productive potential, the latter would be 
more likely to realize this potential and thus enjoy a better occupational position. 
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 Marxists viewed discrimination differently.  While neoclassical 
economists treated the origins of discrimination as exogenous to the capitalist 
system of production, Marxists believed that discrimination was perpetuated 
endogenously.  Capitalists implemented various forms of discrimination as a 
means to prevent camaraderie among workers (Reich, Gordon, and Edwards, 
361).  Employers exploited ethnicity, race, and sex to ensure competing factions 
of workers who would not compromise capitalist hegemony.  They hired groups 
of rival nationalities to antagonize each other.  Jobs were “race-typed” and 
women were paid less than men as a means of forcing these workers to accept 
submissive roles in society (ibid., 362).  As capitalism evolved beyond a relatively 
homogenous labor force, capitalists stoked race conflicts and other forms of social 
unrest to ensure their continued perch atop the social hierarchy.         
   Such an emphasis in academia on discrimination encouraged 
development of theories of personal income distribution because discrimination 
was fundamentally based on the notion that not all workers were the same. 
Employers assumed that white male workers were superior to other workers even 
if the “intrinsic identities” between workers were equal (Arrow, 1971, 28).  The 
presence and influence of discrimination required that laborers no longer be viewed 
as homogenous members of a social class but instead be considered individual 
economic agents.  When studying income distribution, economists acknowledged 
that individuals faced different environments and constraints that influenced their 
position in the labor force.  There was thus a need to conduct economic analyses 
on a personal level.  Becker foreshadowed the rise of human capital theory in The 
Economics of Discrimination by mentioning that a relationship existed between 
economic capacity and “the capital invested in [people] through education” 
(Becker, 1971 (1957), 112).  
 The notion of heterogeneity in the labor force was an important 
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implication of the discussion on discrimination.  Incorporating a heterogeneous 
labor-force into income distribution analysis became necessary because people 
could no longer be sorted into broad categories such as laborers and capitalists. 
Reich, Gordon, and Edwards (1973) studied heterogeneity within the labor market 
from a historical perspective.  They asserted that the captains of industry sought 
to capture control over product and factor markets because they had been relieved 
of the competitive pressures inherent in the previous stage of capitalism (Reich, 
Gordon, and Edwards, 1973, 361).  In order to establish themselves in product 
markets, capitalists of the new age of capitalism had to differentiate themselves 
from their competitors in order to survive.  Yet while product differentiation 
conferred the indirect benefits of monopoly capitalism, Reich, Gordon, and 
Edwards pointed out another, more sinister and explicit motive for promoting 
heterogeneity in the labor force that accompanied the rise of monopoly capitalism.
 Reich, Edwards and Gordon argued that capitalists encouraged a shift 
away from homogenization in the labor force “to break down the increasingly 
unified worker interests that grew out of the proletarianization of work” (Reich, 
Edwards and Gordon, 1973, 361).  They believed that a homogenous labor force 
fostered a sense of unity among the workers that threatened the consolidation of 
power in the capitalist class.  A strategy of “divide and conquer” was therefore 
needed to quash any semblance of solidarity in the labor force (ibid., 361).  Thus 
while heterogeneity of the labor-force may have arisen with the evolution of 
capitalism, it was perpetuated by the capitalists as a preventative measure against 
class cohesion amongst laborers.    
 There were also studies conducted within a neoclassical framework that 
showed evidence of heterogeneity of the contemporary labor force.  Gallaway 
(1967) found that although workers responded positively to earnings, distance 
acted as a deterrent to job mobility.  Workers thus did not always move to regions 
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paying higher wages (Gallaway, 1967, 465).  The decision to forego a higher 
income was rational because the uncertainty due to imperfect information created 
trade-off costs between distance and earnings.  Workers faced a higher degree of 
uncertainty with longer distances because distance acted as an “information filter 
which inhibits the flow of labor market knowledge between areas” (ibid, 472). 
Trade-off costs became increasingly large with distance so workers were less 
likely to move in order to gain a marginal increase in income.  Wages therefore 
did not necessarily equalize across regions; differences in incomes for identical 
jobs could persist.  
 Gallaway (1967) also found evidence that labor was not easily 
substitutable.  Trade-off costs were not limited only to distance, skill also acted 
as a barrier to entry for employment in an industry (ibid., 471).  Workers from 
some industries faced more restrictive barriers to entry than workers from other 
industries because labor was specialized.  A wide range of trade-off costs existed 
across industries: workers in professions with higher trade-off costs embodied less 
transferable skills as a result of extended parochial training (ibid., 472).  Workers 
who thus received highly specialized training were not able to find alternate 
employment outside of their chosen industry and earn an income comparable to 
the one they received in their former industry.  Specialization of skills in the labor 
force therefore greatly affected the ability of workers to switch professions.  Both 
interregional and inter-industry heterogeneity therefore challenged the classical 
assumption of homogeneity within the labor force.     
 Analyses of discrimination and labor force heterogeneity facilitated 
a renaissance of interest in income distribution theory.  They signaled that 
labor could no longer be viewed through the perspective of classical political 
economy.  Workers could no longer be viewed as easily interchangeable.  But 
while discrimination and heterogeneity of the labor force identified the need for 
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a reevaluation of income distribution, these studies did not develop theories of 
personal income distribution on their own.  Human capital theory and segmented 
labor market theory offered competing explanations of how discrimination and 
heterogeneity within the labor force influenced personal income distribution.  For 
instance, discrimination encouraged segmented labor markets, but “discrimination 
itself does not create the segmentation” (Harrison and Sum, 1979, 698).  Human 
capital theory sought to “single out individual investment behavior as a basic 
factor in the heterogeneity of labor incomes” (Mincer, 1970, 6).  Theories of 
personal income distribution that emerged during the rebirth of thought on income 
distribution were thus influenced by the prominent issues of the mid-twentieth 
century.  
Human Capital Theory 
 Human capital theory operated under the assumption that individuals 
decided to invest in training or education that allowed them to obtain the skills 
that made them more productive and consequently determined their income 
(Becker, 1962, 9).  The distribution of personal income could thus be explained 
through an analysis of the distribution of human capital among participants in 
the labor force.  Human capital theorists argued that demand for this training and 
education was determined by the marginal rate of return on investment, and that 
its supply was determined by the volume of funds available for an individual 
to acquire training or investment (Mincer, 1970, 18).  Wage rates were market 
prices that reflected the relative scarcity or surplus of different types of labor.  This 
explanation of the personal distribution of income was thoroughly grounded in 
neoclassical economics.        
 Jacob Mincer, Theodore Schultz, and Gary Becker were the pioneers 
of human capital theory.  All three acknowledged that human capital was a 
broad term that included components such as physical health and psychological 
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well-being, but they agreed that training was the most important type of human 
capital formation.  Mincer (1958) constructed a model examining the effect of 
investment on human capital under the assumption of rational choice. He argued 
that individuals chose the amount of training they wanted based on their perceived 
learning capacity (Mincer, 1958, 286).  People with greater learning capacities 
chose to acquire more training and enter professions requiring more training. 
Furthermore, earnings within a profession fell along a “life-path” where older 
workers earned more than younger workers (ibid., 288).  Mincer suggested that 
workers gained experience the longer they worked in a profession, which increased 
their productivity and income.  Professions that required more training also paid 
higher salaries because they required longer postponement of earnings (Mincer, 
1970, 7).  Higher incomes were thus partly compensation for the shortened period 
during which those who received the training enjoyed returns on their investment. 
Personal income distribution was determined by the initial decision of how much 
training to acquire and how much on-the-job training a worker obtained in their 
chosen profession.
 Schultz (1961) built upon Mincer’s work by contending that the decision 
to invest in human capital was influenced by the expected return on investment. 
He asserted that while “any capability produced by human investment becomes 
part of the human agent and hence cannot be sold; it is nevertheless ‘in touch 
with the marketplace’ by affecting the wages and salaries the human agent can 
earn” (Schultz, 1961, 8).  Similar to Mincer, Schultz concluded that people who 
benefited the most from investment in human capital were the most likely to 
invest the greatest amount in training.  Schultz’s analysis diverged from Mincer’s, 
however, in the type of training studied.  Schultz focused on measuring the 
returns to formal education because he believed that the exact role of on-the-
job training in modern industry was not adequately understood (ibid., 10).  He 
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argued that formal education had taken over a significant portion of the training 
and preparation traditionally acquired through on-the-job training arrangements 
such as apprenticeships.  Schultz chose to study how the stock of education in 
the labor force affected economic growth.  He asserted that a more educated 
labor force was a more productive labor force and found that between 1900 and 
1956, the stock of education in the labor force grew twice as fast as the stock of 
reproducible capital (ibid., 11).  It was therefore greater educational attainment, 
and subsequently higher levels of human capital, that drove American economic 
growth in the first half of the twentieth century.
 Perhaps the most comprehensive promotion of human capital theory 
advocated during the rebirth of income distribution theory was Human Capital 
and the Personal Distribution of Income by Becker (1967).  He constructed a 
model of income distribution similar to Mincer’s by incorporating the assumptions 
of rational choice and variable life-paths of earnings.  Furthermore human capital 
was discussed mostly in the context of educational attainment.  But rather than 
simply reviewing earlier work, Becker also wanted to expand “our rudimentary 
knowledge of the forces generating income distributions” (Becker, 1967, 12). 
Therefore while Mincer and Schultz identified the causes of the skewness of 
income distribution, Becker undertook to explain them better.
 Becker first summarized two special cases of the distribution of human 
capital.  Under the “egalitarian” approach, he assumed that all people faced the 
same demand conditions for human capital and that income was determined by the 
supply of opportunities to invest in human capital faced by individuals.  In short, 
the egalitarian approach proposed equal capacity to benefit from investment in 
human capital, and that differences in environment determined the distribution of 
human capital (ibid., 13).  Income variances could be explained by family wealth, 
subsidies and factors such as luck that shifted the supply curve for human capital 
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outward.  The “elite” approach was essentially the opposite.  It presumed supply 
conditions to be identical and that demand for human capital was determined 
by the amount of investment in training and education (ibid., 16).  More able 
workers, for instance, were more likely to invest in human capital and thus have a 
higher demand for it.
 Becker believed that in reality, social institutions influenced both the 
supply and demand for human capital (ibid., 24).  Students with greater natural 
ability not only had greater demand for human capital, their exceptional capacities 
also made them likelier to attend better schools and make them more attractive 
scholarship applicants.  Legislation aimed at eradicating poverty shifted the 
supply curve of human capital for less wealthy people outward, thereby reducing 
the cost of investment.  Through his analysis Becker provided a comprehensive 
explanation for how investment in human capital determined the personal 
distribution of income.
 In the twentieth century, economists began to shift their focus from away 
from explaining the class distribution of income and towards analyses of the 
distribution of income among individuals.  This change was motivated by studies 
on economics of discrimination and increasing heterogeneity of the labor force. 
Clark’s theory of marginal productivity first broached the notion of disaggregating 
classes, and served as the foundation for human capital theory, the most influential 
neoclassical theory of personal income distribution that emerged during the 
renaissance of income distribution theory in the mid-twentieth century.  Mincer, 
Shultz, and Becker developed human capital theory to explain how the marginal 
productivity of workers was determined, and thus develop a more comprehensive 
understanding of the relationship between wages and marginal productivity.
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Criticisms of Human Capital Theory
 Three basic criticisms arose in response to human capital theory.  One 
group of economists cited various econometric issues with studies that measured 
the impact of investment in human capital on output.  Griliches (1977) asserted 
that an “ability” problem and the possible influence of optimizing behavior on 
schooling decisions by individuals had not been addressed in models constructed 
in the framework of human capital theory.  Ability accounted for the possibility that 
a given level of investment in human capital yielded varying returns depending 
on the person.  Including an ability variable in empirical analyses, however, 
proved troublesome because it was difficult to measure (Griliches, 1977, 6). 
Optimization of schooling decisions was troublesome for human capital theory 
because such behavior was based on anticipated future earnings.  Calculating 
the optimal level of schooling or on-the-job training implicitly required strong 
assumptions about individual behavior, which Griliches argued models of human 
capital theory failed to recognize.  For instance, while there was initially a positive 
relationship between age and experience, older workers also reached a point 
where they became less productive than younger workers (ibid., 14).  Human 
capital theory therefore implicitly assumed infinite life, even though it argued 
that jobs requiring more training required higher compensation due to a shorter 
working life.   Furthermore, he also stated that since optimal schooling decisions 
were based on anticipated earnings, any difference between ex-post and ex-ante 
incomes increased the correlation between the schooling and residual terms in a 
model measuring income (ibid., 13).  
 Blaug (1976) was also critical of the econometric viability of human 
capital theory.  Measuring the effect of on-the-job training on income was 
especially problematic because the various aspects of on-the-job training were not 
adequately defined.  He contended that human capital theory did not differentiate 
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between increased productivity from costless learning-by-doing and costly self-
investment (Blaug, 1976, 839).  Human capital theory therefore did not provide 
sufficient measures of on-the-job training by limiting itself to general and specific 
training.  Blaug faulted human capital theory models for producing significant, 
unexplained differences in returns to investment in different types of human 
capital as well.  These discrepancies were due to the neglect of variations in 
educational quality and the existence of an “overtaking point” (ibid., 838).  The 
benefits of schooling grew over time rather than being fully realized immediately 
after schooling was completed.  Blaug attributed these measurement errors to the 
overly ambitious nature of human capital theory.  He believed the focus of human 
capital theory was too broad, making it difficult to determine “what hypothesis is 
being tested” (ibid., 832).   
 Advocates of the screening hypothesis constituted another group critical 
of human capital theory.  They asserted that the assumption of perfect information 
in labor markets was unrealistic.  Economic theory needed to reflect the high 
degree of imperfect information employers faced when reviewing job applicants. 
Supporters of the screening hypothesis agreed that human capital theory was 
correct in that individual incomes were determined by the level of investment 
in human capital, but they developed a different explanation for how human 
capital affected income.  The link between human capital theory and the principle 
of marginal productivity did not explain personal income distribution because 
a “diploma serves primarily as an imperfect measure of performance ability 
rather than as evidence of acquired skills” (Arrow, 1973, 193).  The screening 
hypothesis essentially argued that education separated more able workers from 
less able workers.  Income was determined by ability, not productivity.  Stiglitz 
(1975) contended that educational screening occurred naturally in society because 
it was the “byproduct” of providing knowledge and career direction to students in 
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schools (Stiglitz, 1975, 294).  Bright students were identified by teachers who then 
passed this information along the educational chain.  School was used primarily to 
sort students into levels of ability, not to develop skills to make more productive 
workers, as human capital theory suggested.  
 Several important assumptions served as the foundation for the screening 
hypothesis.  Most important among them was the existence of inherent market 
failure within the labor markets stemming from the lack of knowledge and cost 
of obtaining information about potential employees (Taubman and Wales, 1975, 
112).  College diplomas were used by employers as a proxy for ability because 
they offered quick insight into the skills and capabilities embodied in applicants. 
As a result, the supply of labor for high-paying occupations is restricted to the 
well-educated (ibid., 118).  Stiglitz argued that access to information also affected 
the decision making of job applicants.  Individuals decided how much education 
to invest in based on their perception of their ability.  Risk-averse people therefore 
chose to forego the chance of being screened as a below-average worker even 
if they were highly capable (Stiglitz, 287).  Yet while educational screening 
was imperfect, Stiglitz cautioned against forbidding employers to practice it. 
Screening would still occur, it would merely change forms.  Forcing employers 
to rely solely on on-the-job screening would make screening more expensive and 
reduce output (ibid., 291).  Everyone would be left worse off.  
 The screening hypothesis made a compelling case against the limitations 
of human capital theory, but the former faced scrutiny on theoretical grounds 
as well.  In the development of his model supporting the screening hypothesis, 
Arrow (1973) acknowledged that “employers cannot measure ability directly, 
and there is no reason to suppose that the economist is going to do any better” 
(Arrow, 216).  Screening was based on the assumption that people have differing 
levels of ability and that the more able use educational attainment to signal this. 
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Yet if ability in general cannot be measured, it is nearly impossible to determine 
its distribution.  Layard and Psacharopoulos (1974) also conducted an empirical 
study based on Arrow’s work and obtained results challenging the predictions of 
the screening hypothesis.  For instance, they found that dropouts and students 
who completed their coursework earned similar rates of return (Layard and 
Psacharopoulos, 1974, 991).  That challenged the notion put forth by the screening 
hypothesis that a bachelor’s degree signaled to employers a more capable worker 
than an applicant who completed only some coursework.  Although the screening 
hypothesis provided a neoclassical alternative to human capital theory, it failed 
to unseat human capital theory as the primary explanation of personal income 
distribution in orthodox economics.        
IV. Radical Political Economy
 Radical political economy criticized human capital theory from a 
heterodox perspective.  Its supporters were less concerned with the empirical issues 
of human capital theory, instead choosing to focus on the fundamental perception 
of production in neoclassical economics.  While neoclassical economics shifted 
focus to the functional aspect of production with the introduction of the theory of 
marginal productivity, radical political economy asserted that the social aspect of 
production was the primary determinant of personal income.  Marxists criticized 
human capital theory for artificially resolving the inherent class conflict associated 
with capitalist systems of production by considering every worker a capitalist 
(Bowles and Gintis, 1975, 74).  In fact, radical political economy questioned 
human capital theory’s definition of capital.  Learning could only be a form of 
capital if it allowed workers to go into production on their own (ibid., 79).  
 Radical political economists challenged the notion that workers were 
paid according to their marginal productivity because they believed that the 
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structure of capitalist firms encouraged the de-skilling of their workers (Rebitzer, 
1993, 1401).  Essentially this meant that, rather than encouraging workers to 
acquire more training in order to become more productive, they actually preferred 
workers to embody only a minimum level of human capital.  As a result they 
became discouraged and the mundane nature of their work prevented them from 
increasing, or even maintaining, their productivity.  This is a contemporary re-
statement of the inevitable alienation of workers by capitalists espoused by Marx. 
Human capital theory argued that higher productivity levels caused higher wages. 
Radical political economy effectively argued the opposite: lower wages caused 
productivity to fall.  Workers embodied a natural endowment of “human capital” 
that was augmented by schooling and training, but the economic return to these 
investments was governed by the extent to which these same workers legitimated 
the authority of firms over their employees (Bowles and Gintis, 1974, 80).  Schools 
were important, but not in the way human capital theory proposed.  The main 
goal of the education system was “to prepare students by developing attitudes 
appropriate to the political position they can be expected to occupy within firms” 
(Rebitzer, 1993, 1403).  Marginal productivity was therefore unimportant to an 
analysis of personal income distribution.     
 Since radical political economy criticized the theoretical foundations of 
human capital theory, it can be viewed as a critique of the orthodox theory of 
personal income distribution.  Radical political economy was “not ready to reduce 
the school system’s economically relevant activities to screening and labeling” 
(ibid., 75).  Imperfect information did exist in the labor market, but education was 
not used as a signaling device to help more capable workers of signaling their 
level of ability.  The screening hypothesis was thus not a sufficient explanation 
for the distribution of personal income distribution either.  While radical political 
economy acknowledged neoclassical economics’ contribution to the theory of 
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personal income distribution, its explanations of personal income distribution 
were incorrect.  Marxist dissatisfaction with neoclassical theories of personal 
income distribution led to the formation of their own theory of personal income 
distribution: segmented labor market theory.  
Segmented Labor Market Theory
 While human capital theory explained differences in personal income 
levels through a neoclassical perspective, segmented labor market theory sought to 
explain personal income distribution in a Marxian framework.  In this framework, 
“political and economic forces within American capitalism have given rise to and 
perpetuated segmented labor markets, and … it is incorrect to view the sources of 
segmented labor markets as exogenous to the economic system” (Reich, Gordon, 
and Edwards, 359).  Instead of contending that the personal distribution of income 
was determined by the functional aspect of production, proponents of segmented 
labor market theory argued that it was mainly the result of the social aspect of 
production.  Wages and productivities applied to the jobs themselves, rather than 
the individual workers occupying those positions (Harrison and Sum, 1979, 694). 
Similar to the divide in classical political economy between Ricardo and Marx, a 
split between neoclassicals and a group influenced by Marxism developed during 
the renaissance of income distribution theory in the mid-twentieth century.
 Segmented labor market theorists differentiated between primary and 
secondary labor markets.  The primary labor market comprised firms with market 
power, sustainable sources of income, and the ability to pay above-subsistence 
wages (Harrison and Sum, 1979, 689).  Firms in this sector could afford to pay 
for training for their employees because their market power allowed them to pass 
some of the cost to consumers.  Firms also invested in human capital to increase the 
productivity of their workers.  Consistent with Marxism, members of a relatively 
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small group whose size was maintained by rigid entry requirements earned high 
incomes while most workers toiled away in unattractive and unfulfilling jobs. 
And since firms in the primary sector invested significant resources in training and 
physical capital, jobs in this sector required stable working habits.  The primary 
labor market thus provided relatively stable employment.  Due to higher wages 
and greater stability, jobs in this sector were highly valued.  Poor people were not 
excluded from the primary segment merely for being lazy or lacking the capacity 
for human capital necessary for entry into the primary segment.  The institutional 
framework of the capitalist system artificially restricted entry into the primary 
labor market (ibid., 694).  Poor people were poor mostly due to employment 
prospects restricted to the secondary labor market.    
 Jobs in the secondary sector were much less secure.  Unstable product 
demand prevented firms from ensuring long-term employment.  Furthermore, 
production processes in this segment were labor-intensive and involved simple 
or repetitive tasks so workers were interchangeable.  Stable working habits were 
discouraged as a result and there was little opportunity for career advancement. 
The secondary labor market was connected to the primary labor market through 
such means as subcontracting but “many adults are unable to escape from it and 
spend much or all of their lives there” (ibid., 690).  Secondary workers thus played 
an important role in the economy because the primary sector was dependent 
upon their employment for such services as subcontracting, but they were also 
expendable.  In effect, the secondary labor market was the modern Marxists’ 
equivalent to the reserve army of the unemployed.  Competition kept wages low 
among a group of people without which the economy could not function.  
 Labor market segmentation went beyond this general distinction between 
primary and secondary sectors.  Piore (1972) further segmented the primary labor 
sector into upper and lower tiers.  Workers in the upper tier held management jobs, 
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which conferred higher status and pay, and greater economic security.  There were 
relatively high turnover rates but this was attributed to career advancement rather 
than termination.  Members of the lower tier of the primary sector were regularly 
employed blue collar workers.  Workers adhered to a strict set of work rules that 
were predicated upon the hegemonic relationship between worker and supervisor. 
Each segment had a different “mobility chain” that signified the opportunity for 
career advancement (Piore, 1972, 6).  Workers in the upper tier had the most 
opportunity for promotion, the lower tier was more rigid, whereas there was little 
chance for advancement in the secondary labor market.  
 Race was cited as one of the primary causes of labor market segmentation. 
Segmentation by race arose from “certain jobs that are ‘race-typed,’ segregated 
by prejudice and labor market institutions,” (Reich, Gordon, and Edwards, 360). 
This was compounded by geographic separation of employment opportunities, 
which hindered the flow of labor.  Harrison (1972) found that underemployment 
and poverty persisted in urban ghettoes, due to a lack of economic opportunity 
for minorities.  Minorities were considerably limited to a selection of “typically 
urban” jobs that prevented workers from fully recognizing their productive 
potentials (Harrison, 1972, 811).  There were thus jobs that were often associated 
with specific races located in specific geographic areas.  According to segmented 
labor markets, social institutions were the most important factor in determining 
the distribution of personal income.  Workers with higher levels of productivity 
did earn higher incomes, but the access to investments that increased productivity 
was determined by social institutions prevailing at the time. 
 Segmented labor market theory presented a heterodox alternative in 
the proliferation of theories of personal income distribution in the mid-twentieth 
century.  While human capital theory offered an explanation for personal income 
distribution within a marginal productivity framework, segmented labor market 
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theory stressed the importance of social institutions to the determination of 
income distribution among individuals.  It therefore appeared that two polemic 
approaches to the analysis of personal income distribution developed during the 
renaissance of income distribution analysis.       
    
V. Reconciling Human Capital Theory and Segmented Labor Market 
Theory
 Previous work has been done comparing the relationship between 
mainstream orthodox economics and the heterodox alternative.  Rebitzer (1993) 
argued that “radical and mainstream neoclassical labor economics have exerted 
an important influence on the other” (Rebitzer, 1396).  A relationship could 
therefore be drawn between the two, despite their presumably opposed theoretical 
foundations.  But despite making this connection, Rebitzer treats neoclassical and 
radical approaches to labor market segmentation separately (ibid., 1412).  Thus 
while there was significant overlap between the competing theories of personal 
income distribution, they were still distinct.  A closer examination of the human 
capital theory and segmented labor market theory literature, however, reveals an 
even greater degree of overlap than suggested by Rebitzer, so much so that they 
effectively become identical.  
 The treatment of class conflict by human capital theory was one of 
the major points of contention segmented labor market theorists had with the 
orthodox approach to personal income distribution.  Proponents of segmented 
labor markets argued that human capital theory “formally excludes the relevance 
of class and class conflict to the explication of labor market phenomena” (Bowles 
and Gintis, 75).  One of the fundamental underpinnings that segmented labor 
market theorists built upon when responding to human capital theory was the 
argument that human capital theory artificially resolved class conflict by making 
everyone a capitalist.  Segmented labor market theorists believed that the persistent 
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significance of sorting workers into groups “is neither explained nor predicted 
by orthodox theory” (Reich, Gordon, and Edwards, 359).  Although segmented 
labor market theory championed itself as a theory of personal income distribution 
that had corrected the theoretical flaws in human capital theory, it was not the 
dramatic departure from orthodox theory promised.  Reconciliation between these 
competing theories is therefore not only possible, but relatively straightforward.  
It is not entirely correct for critics of human capital theory to argue that it 
“predicts that labor market differences among groups will decline over time” (ibid., 
359).  Human capital theorists implicitly acknowledged the importance of social 
institutions when explaining how individuals decided on the amount of human 
capital to invest in.  Accumulation of human capital was restricted by “legal and 
other obstacles to financing investment in human capital” (Becker and Chiswick, 
1966, 359).  Important social institutions such as inheritance of property income 
and availability of scholarships and loans were crucial factors that workers had to 
consider when making their investment decisions regarding human capital.  Since 
the type of employment available to applicants was determined by the amount 
of training and education they embodied, social institutions had direct influence 
on the personal distribution of income in human capital theory.  The influence of 
social institutions was thus an integral part of human capital theory and served 
to perpetuate differences between groups of workers.  To argue that differences 
between groups would decline over time necessarily implies a convergence of 
social institutions that allowed everyone equal opportunity to invest in human 
capital, and that everyone benefited equally from this investment.  
 More importantly, segmented labor markets themselves are implicitly 
developed in human capital theory.  The type of profession available to workers, 
according to human capital theory, depended on their investment in human capital. 
Once people decide how much to invest, they are effectively sorted into labor 
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market segments according to the level of training they have acquired.  Workers 
then remain in their assigned segment.  Human capital theorists develop their 
concept of segmented labor markets by referring to the stream of income as the 
life-path of earnings determined by investment in human capital.  The notion of 
mobility chains held by segmented labor market theorists articulated a similar 
progression.  Furthermore, both theories speak of stations as points along the life-
path of earnings or mobility chain. 
Mincer (1958) effectively argued that workers were more unlikely 
to switch professions in other industries and job categories once they decided 
how much to invest in human capital because life-paths of earnings existed for 
each occupation.  Jobs could be sorted by “occupational rank” (Mincer, 1958, 
288).   Higher occupational rank led to higher income and greater social standing, 
which resulted in steeper life-paths of earnings.  Workers gained experience and 
became more productive the longer they remained in a profession and moved 
up their respective life-paths of earnings (ibid., 287).  There was therefore little 
incentive for workers to switch professions.  They would not be able to obtain 
a job of higher occupational rank because they invested too little in human 
capital and were thus unqualified for such positions.  Switching to a profession 
of lower occupational rank was irrational because doing so required sacrificing a 
steeper life-path of earning for a flatter life-path of earning, as well as movement 
down the new life-path of earning to reflect the lost experience from switching 
professions.  Segmented labor market theory therefore essentially reiterated the 
notion of segmented labor markets developed by human capital theory.  
 Entry into stations occupying the primary labor market of segmented 
labor market theory was similarly regulated in human capital theory.  Segmented 
labor market theory argued that “the educational system does much more than 
produce human capital,” (Bowles and Gintis, 1975, 78).  Segmented labor market 
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theorists believed that the existence of meritocratic society that gave members of 
one group power over another group.  While there was small window for young 
workers to escape the secondary labor market, most did not.  Only those who 
obtained “bridge” jobs in such fields as metal-working could facilitate inter-
segment mobility (Osterman, 1975, 514).  Workers who were unable to enter 
the primary labor market early were trapped in the secondary labor market. 
Human capital theory developed rigid barriers to entry to labor markets prior to 
the development of segmented labor market theory.  The belief that entry into 
professions was regulated by investment in human capital implied the existence 
of a meritocratic society from a human capital theory perspective.  Furthermore, 
windows of opportunity were also an important aspect of human capital theory. 
Once individuals decided how much human capital to invest in, their window 
of opportunity effectively closed because they had sorted themselves into their 
respective professions.            
 There is thus a common perception of segmented labor markets and a 
labor market hierarchy.  Both human capital and segmented labor market theories 
of personal income distribution promoted the notion of a rigid stratification of the 
labor market in which “each occupation is seen as a set in a stratum of society 
defined by income and way of life” (Brown, 1977, 118).  Workers will be sorted 
into their stations at a fairly early age.  Segmented labor market theory argues 
that this sorting is governed by social institutions. Human capital theory argues 
that it is determined by the level of investment made in human capital, which 
itself is influenced by social institutions.  But regardless of how this sorting is 
actually conducted, both human capital theory and segmented labor theory argue 
that its effects are lasting.  Once the sorting process is completed, it is uncommon 
for workers to move between segments.  Thus contrary to a gradual decline in 
differences between groups of workers, human capital theory implies that there 
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is a tendency for them to endure, and even strengthen, over time.  A worker 
sorted into a lower segment of the labor market was not likely to move into the 
upper segment and subsequently propagate the benefits of greater opportunity for 
investment in human capital upon future generations.  
 It is therefore difficult for supporters of segmented labor market theory 
to criticize human capital theory when the implications of each theory of personal 
income distribution are so similar.  Human capital theory argues that segmented 
labor markets are the result of individual choice.  People face constraints on the 
amount of human capital they can invest in, but within these constraints people are 
free to choose any level of investment they want.  While segmented labor market 
theory also shows how labor market segmentation persists, it treats the origins 
of labor market segmentation as exogenous: the prevailing social institutions 
determined where in the labor market hierarchy an individual ultimately ended up. 
The largest theoretical difference between the two is thus a matter of endogeneity. 
This is ironic because Bowles and Gintis cite “the assumption of exogenously 
determined individual preferences” as a shortcoming of human capital theory 
while failing to recognize that segmented labor market theory is endogenous only 
to the extent that it explains how segmented labor markets reproduce themselves 
from an exogenously determined origin (Bowles and Gintis, 81).  
 The above criticisms are based on the argument that human capital theory 
does not account for the importance of social institutions in the determination 
of an individual’s income.  Yet as the discussion above demonstrates, this 
argument can be clearly and concisely refuted.  Human capital theory implicitly 
incorporates social institutions into its theoretical framework, and does develop 
a notion of segmented labor markets, but it is not manifested in the same way 
as segmented labor market theory.  The influence of social institutions is much 
more implicit in human capital theory because human capital theory implicitly 
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factors them into individual decisions to invest in human capital.  Therefore a 
more accurate assessment of human capital theory is that human capital theory 
assumes that individual incomes are determined by the level of investment made 
by individuals, given their unique constraints which are the product of social 
institutions.  Segmented labor market theory makes these constraints much more 
rigid, diminishing the impact of individual choice.  This, however, does not 
preclude the undeniable similarities underpinning the theoretical frameworks of 
orthodox and heterodox theories of personal income distribution, respectively. 
 
VI. Conclusion
 To argue that the late-twentieth century ushered income distribution 
in from the cold implies that its importance to economic theory had faded and 
needed to be revived.  It is important to recognize the renaissance of income 
distribution theory in the mid-twentieth century.  Atkinson failed to acknowledge 
the important contributions of human capital and segmented labor market theories 
of personal income distribution, instead choosing to cite development economics 
as the primary focus of income distribution in the twentieth century.  In reality the 
twentieth century saw a great debate emerge over competing theories of personal 
income distribution, a debate that appeared to represent a wider gap than the one 
between classical and Marxian class theories of income distribution. 
 Ricardo and Marx developed class theories of income distribution to 
explain the class conflict that dominated European society during the rise of 
classical political economy.  Each acknowledged the importance of the rate of 
profit to class distributions of income, but from this common point of emphasis 
their analyses diverged considerably.  The divergence in class theories of income 
distribution was due primarily to competing beliefs about the sustainability of the 
capitalist system of production.  Ricardo believed a falling rate of profit regulated 
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capitalist accumulation: capitalists were competitive but could coexist.  Marx, 
on the other hand, deemed capitalism unsustainable.  The capitalist thirst for 
accumulation was driven by an eat-or-be-eaten urgency.  Accumulation meant 
survival and as capital became more concentrated, capitalist oppression grew to 
such an extent that it would help spark a proletariat uprising. 
 Neither Ricardo nor Marx attempted to develop a theory of personal 
income distribution because the labor force at the time was relatively homogenous, 
and they were living during an era of intense class competition, as evidenced by the 
Corn Laws.  The primary concerns facing economists during the era of classical 
political economy were thus much more related to classes than individuals.  The 
dominance of class theories of income distribution persisted until Clark introduced 
the notion that factors were paid according to their marginal productivity.  He 
did not explain how marginal productivity was determined, however, choosing 
instead to merely state that there was a relationship between the two.  Neoclassical 
economists developed theories of personal income distribution that sufficiently 
explained how marginal productivity influenced income.  Human capital theory 
emerged as an important theory of personal income distribution but faced many 
critics.  One group of critics, heavily influenced by Marxism, argued that income 
distribution on the individual level was determined by the social institutions of 
capitalist society.  They developed segmented labor market theory in response 
to human capital theory and it appeared that an even greater divide over income 
distribution theory surfaced than the one between Ricardo and Marx.  
 Growing interest in discrimination and increasing heterogeneity of the 
labor force also encouraged the development of theories of personal income 
distribution.  In short, the consensus that all labor was easily substitutable, 
which had persisted since classical political economy, began to break down. 
Economists began operating under the assumption that laborers were not easily 
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interchangeable.  Drawing upon the limitations of Clark’s The Distribution of 
Wealth, numerous theories of personal income distribution were developed. 
Among them, human capital theory and segmented labor market theory emerged 
as the most influential orthodox and heterodox theories, respectively.  
 Yet upon closer examination, the presumed differences between human 
capital theory and segmented labor market theory can be reconciled to a large 
extent.  Segmented labor market theory faults human capital theory for ignoring 
the role of social institutions and a segmented labor-force in the distribution of 
personal income.  Human capital theory, however, implies that labor markets 
are segmented, and that barriers to entry in the labor market are largely due to 
social institutions.  Workers were sorted according to the amount of human capital 
they embodied.  Investment in human capital, which was constrained by the 
environment produced by social institutions, thus acted as a barrier to entry.  The 
most significant difference between the two is the amount of freedom in workers’ 
initial employment decisions.  Human capital theory argues that segmented labor 
markets are essentially a product of individual choice while segmented labor 
market theory asserts that segmented labor markets are pre-assigned. 
 Not only were there numerous important contributions to income 
distribution theory during the period it was supposedly out in the cold, a close 
connection between human capital and segmented labor market theories of personal 
income distribution developed.  Segmented labor market theory was essentially 
a modification of human capital theory, placing more explicit emphasis on the 
role of social institutions in the explanation of individual income distribution. 
Although this distinction may seem nuanced, it is important to recognize that 
segmented labor market theory is not entirely redundant.  Segmented labor market 
theory stresses the importance of social institutions while human capital theory 
acknowledges their influence much more implicitly.  Professor Atkinson may have 
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had a valid argument that income distribution theory had become too focused on 
development economics, but the twentieth century was the most important era of 
income distribution analysis since classical political economy.
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